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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 -----x SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 3 COMMISSION, Plaintiff, 05 CV 5231 4 V. 5 AMERINDO INVESTMENT ADVISORS, 6 Defendant. ----x 7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 05 CR 621 Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 ALBERTO VILAR AND GARY TANAKA, Defendant 10 11 New York, N.Y. 12 January 10, 2012 4:45 p.m. 13 Before: 14 HON. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, 15 District Judge 16 APPEARANCES 17 US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 18 Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: SHARON COHEN LEVIN 19 BENJAMIN A. NAFTALIS (CR) 20 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 21 Attorneys for Plaintiff Amerindo BY: NEAL JACOBSON 22 MARK D. SALZBERG 23 GARY TANAKA, Pro Se Defendant 24 VIVIAN SHEVITZ JANE SIMKIN SMITH, of Counsel 25 Attorneys for Defendant Vilar (CR)

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121avilc DAVID C. BURGER Attorney for Vilar, (CV) VICTORIA B. EIGER Attorney for Defendants, Tanaka (CR) JULIAN W. FRIEDMAN Attorney for Investors Marcus, Heitkoenig, Salvitti PATRICK W. BEGOS Attorney for Investor, Mayer THOMAS J. HALL Attorney for Investor, Sayko

1 (In open court; defendant Tanaka present via telephone conference call) 2 3 JUDGE SWAIN: Good afternoon, please be seated. 4 This is a combined hearing in the United States 5 against Vilar and Tanaka, and SEC v. Amerindo. 6 I'm Judge Swain, the judge presiding over the civil 7 case, and Judge Sullivan, who resides over the criminal case is here as well. And, first, I would like to take appearances 8 9 from the people who are at the table. 10 Actually, I think I'll start with Mr. Tanaka who is on 11 the phone so that we can confirm that we can hear him and he 12 hear us. And Mr. Tanaka, we do have a court reporter here in 13 the courtroom, so we should be able to overcome inaudibility 14 issues. If she can't hear you, we'll let you know and ask you to repeat something. 15 16

So, Mr. Tanaka, would you introduce yourself first?

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Gary Tanaka.

JUDGE SWAIN: Good afternoon, Mr. Tanaka.

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Good afternoon, your Honor.

JUDGE SWAIN: So let's start with the front table.

Ms. Levin.

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MS. LEVIN: Yeah, good morning, your Honors. I'm Sharon Levin, I'm here for the government. I am handling the asset forfeiture matters. Here with me is Ben Naftalis and he is the prosecutor on the criminal case.

1	MR. JACOBSON: Neal Jacobson on behalf of The
2	Securities and Exchange Commission, and my colleague, Mark
3	Salzberg.
4	MS. SHEVITZ: Vivian Shevitz. And we represent
5	Alberto Vilar in the criminal matter and on the appeal.
6	MR. BURGER: Good afternoon, David Burger,
7	representing Mr. Vilar in the SEC action, your Honor.
8	MS. EIGER: Victoria Eiger. We represent Mr. Tanaka
9	on the criminal appeal.
10	MR. FRIEDMAN: Julian Friedman. I represent three of
11	the investors in ATGF, Paul Marcus, Alfred Heitkoenig and, as
12	of this morning, Dr. Ronald Salvitti. And I'm here by virtue
13	of having written a letter to the Court and the Court blessing
14	my participation in this conference.
15	JUDGE SWAIN: Yes. And there are other
16	representatives of investors or victims here as well. And to
17	the extent we need people to speak, we'll ask you to identify
18	yourselves at that time. I do have the cards on the appearance
19	sheet.
20	But at this point, I'm going to turn matters over in
21	the first instance to Judge Sullivan to talk about the status
22	of the forfeiture progressions.
23	JUDGE SULLIVAN: Okay, thank you very much, Judge
24	Swain.
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Good afternoon to all of you, many of whom I'm meeting

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for the first time.

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Back at the sentencing -- Mr. Naftalis, you were there, I think you might be the only person at these tables that was there -- there was a discussion about forfeiture. Mr. Colton on behalf of Mr. Tanaka said that there was no objection by Mr. Tanaka to take all of the value that was in those accounts, different accounts that have been discussed, and have them forfeited to the government based on the government's representation that they would be used to repay investors. So there seemed to be a consensus at that point that a preliminary order of forfeiture would be appropriate. The parties would then huddle up, figure out where there was consensus, and where there was disagreement with respect to the value of the assets, and who the different investors in those assets were, and what they thought they were entitled to, and then we would be in a better position to know what was going on in the future. That seems to be the last time, really, that was discussed in a way in which there was consensus.

So what if anything has happened since February of 2010 to identify the value of the assets, the universe of investors, and the claims of the investors. There have been some investors who have made claims, and then those claims have been petitioned, petitions made and then those were withdrawn pursuant to some settlement with the government. But I'm fuzzy as to what is the universe of investors, how big it is, and how

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comfortable and confident are we that we have reached the whole potential universe.

So I'm not sure who --

MS. LEVIN: Sharon Levin from the U.S. Attorney's I think I can answer part of that question, but I may need to turn to my colleagues at the SEC to fill in some of the gaps that I have.

In the forfeiture case there is a limited group of victims who were investors, and we have those victims and we know the amounts of their losses.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: How many are there?

MS. LEVIN: There are five.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Just five.

MS. LEVIN: Five that are listed in the restitution order.

> Oh, the restitution order? JUDGE SULLIVAN:

MS. LEVIN: Yes.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: All right.

MS. LEVIN: In addition, to that, there is a larger group that I believe are about maybe 20 to 30. There is an additional group of other investors that were investors in the various different Amerindo funds that will also be considered Amerindo investors for the purposes of any distribution. And to the extent that we have records from Amerindo, we have gone through those records and we have a list. And the SEC has

provided us with a list of the investors with their last known addresses.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: All right, but that's 20 to 30. I assume you have the exact number someplace.

MS. LEVIN: Yes, we do.

But there may be some question -- Mr. Tanaka raised question in the conference that we had before Judge Swain on September 23, that there might be other investors that we're not aware of that are not included in that list. And this is meant to be, our distribution is meant to be full distribution, that no one is excluded. And so, accordingly, we intend to provide some kind of publication on our office's website and work with Mr. Tanaka or his counsel to come up with additional names and addresses as there are then, and provide them with notice and an opportunity to also put in a petition.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: But that hasn't been done.

MS. LEVIN: That has not been done, because we cannot begin the petition for omission process until there is an entry of final order of forfeiture.

JUDGE SWAIN: Is there an impediment to your gathering the information that would permit you, promptly to go, if you will, on the remission procedure once the final order of forfeiture.

MS. LEVIN: There is no impediment. What our plan is, once we have agreement with the defendants, we would like to,

you know, publish the list, or circulate the list, who we have are the investors, and with their last known addresses and see if there is any additions or corrections and then we're ready to go forward and provide, once we have the order of forfeiture, with a notice of the opportunity to fill a petition for omission or mitigation and a sample petition.

JUDGE SWAIN: I noticed on the list of assets that there are a couple of assets that seemed to be identified with employee benefit plans. There is a requirement trust, I believe, and a money purchased plan fund. So has there been any investigation or consideration as to whether there are former employee claims to funds in those particular trusts and/or any trust or ERISA type protections that need to be taken into account?

MS. LEVIN: No, those are all things that we're going to turn to when we have control of the assets.

JUDGE SWAIN: Again, I ask whether there is any impediment to investigation before you have control of the assets, and to the extent there isn't, do you have a timetable for making these investigations.

MS. LEVIN: To the extent that these assets are going to be forfeited, then I can try and have an investigator in my office, move forward on it, and we can go forward and start it tomorrow morning.

JUDGE SWAIN: You have a restraint on them already,

correct?

MS. LEVIN: We have a restraint on the accounts.

JUDGE SWAIN: And you specifically requested forfeiture of them, and there has been no objection specific to those assets or, indeed, any of the ones on the list, has there?

MS. LEVIN: Well, there has been an objection in general to the forfeiture order, and to the entry of the final order of forfeiture. And so the marshal service is not capable of taking possession of the assets and liquidating or managing them at that time. But can we call and investigate as to exactly what there are, are there other parties associated with them, or other parties that are entitled to get notice, there is no impediment to us doing this. We absolutely can provide resources from the U.S. Attorney's Office to look into that.

JUDGE SWAIN: Seems to me, given the amount of time that has passed, and the fact that we're not sure of the universe, that it would be appropriate to do as much in advance of finalization of forfeiture as possible, and do that as quickly as possible.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Yeah, I mean I guess I'm surprised that pave work wasn't done right away. Seems to me at the time of sentencing, there was Mr. Marcus on behalf of Mr. Vilar had made a suggestion that maybe we should put off sentencing until after evaluation or liquidation of the assets had taken place.

And then there was a consensus not to do that, not to wait, it would take too long. But it seemed that there was absolute consensus between defendants and the government that investors should be paid out of the moneys that had been frozen. There was a little bit of dispute as to how much those assets were worth, whether it was 48 million, or 41 or 42 million. But it sounded like there was an awful lot of money to cover the various claims that were anticipated. And so I'm just sort of surprised that we haven't advanced the ball really at all since February of 2010.

MS. LEVIN: Well, we can't, your Honor. We can't -JUDGE SULLIVAN: We can't distribute.

MS. LEVIN: We can't liquidate. The marshal service can't take possession of the assets.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I understand that. I guess identifying the universe of claims, and identifying or nailing down the value of the assets with some precision, wouldn't seem to be something that has to wait until the final forfeiture orders.

MS. LEVIN: There is expense associated. In terms of — we have a valuation for what the assets are, in the joint letter that we submitted to the Court, it provided the value for the securities, as well as the value for the cash account. What we don't have a value for are for their investments in private companies. And that will cost the marshal service

between ten and \$20,000 to make those valuations. And, generally, that money will come out of the money that's being distributed. And we have done the valuation once before, but it didn't necessarily seem to be feasible, in advance of the entry of the order of forfeiture, to find out what the value is. Because the dispute isn't as to what the value of one asset is versus the other, it's whether or not we can move forward and start to liquidate them now.

As to the claim as to the universe of investors, we actually feel pretty confident that we have a list. Because of the concerns that were raised by Mr. Tanaka, we don't believe we need to have any additional investigation. The U.S. Attorney's Office has a much smaller list because our case was different than the SEC's case. So our victims or our investors, for the purpose of our case, were limited to those victims that are included in the restitution order. We have been coordinating with the SEC, and we have their list, and we're ready to go on it. We don't believe that there really are going to be many other additional people, but we don't want to exclude anybody.

I just want to make clear that to the extent it appears like we're not ready to go out and send notice, we absolutely are ready and prepared to send notice out to now — now, we believe we do have the full universe of the Amerindo investors, based upon the SEC's reviews of the Amerindo

records. So it's not really a question that -- it just may be that if one of them, we have forgotten somebody that Mr. Tanaka knows about, that somehow it is not revealed in the records. But we didn't view this as something that needed a detailed investigation.

JUDGE SWAIN: May I ask you this. As to the valuation of the illiquid assets or to the private investments, does your identification of the universe of investors or potential claimants also give you a solid enough sense of the amount of money owed to investors so that you could perhaps determine whether the liquid assets that are held would be sufficient for the distribution, such that the illiquid assets might revert to the defendants, if that's -- you know, if that's the right outcome for excess. I'm wondering whether it is essential to value those assets now.

MS. LEVIN: Well, first all, all of it is investor money, so I'm not sure that any of it will actually -- or none of it will actually go back to the defendants. These are all of the investor accounts. There are a few assets that are included in our substitute asset order such as personal property of Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka. But those are not -- most of that doesn't have real value or there is not really anything there.

In terms of the other investment accounts, my understanding is regardless of whether there is enough to pay

off all of these investors, the rest of that money doesn't actually belong to Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka. But my understanding, in answering your question, is that I don't believe that the liquid assets will actually cover. It should cover pretty close to it, but we're not exactly --

JUDGE SULLIVAN: What is the "it."

MS. LEVIN: The amount that is owed each of the individual Amerindo investors.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: What does that add up to; do you know what the individual investors are claiming?

MS. LEVIN: We think it's around \$44 million.

However — and this information is in large part based upon information that I had from Mr. Litt, when he was on the case, is that there are some Amerindo investors that he has been advised will not be submitting petitions. Among other things, what a common practice is, if there is a hedge fund, sometimes that hedge fund, when it comes time for distribution, no longer is in business under that name anymore and either chooses not to or is unable to claim that money. And that's the experience the Department of Justice often has, is when it comes time for omission or restoration, not all of the investors ultimately will put in a claim. So we think that the amount of money that is available for distribution to the victims should be pretty close to what the loss is that will be filed under the petition for admission or identification process.

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JUDGE SWAIN: And just to be clear, I misspoke when I talked about reversion because, of course, you do have the 54 million-dollar forfeiture order. And so any property that would be necessary to satisfy that order, to the extent that it's upheld, would of course go to the United States, as opposed to reverting to defendants.

MS. LEVIN: One other thing I want to add is that the restitution order is actually for a larger amount, it includes prejudgement interest. And in our proposal, to come up with some kind of proposal, typically the Department of Justice doesn't seek an agreement from the defendants on distribution of forfeitable assets. We're asking for it here because we would like to do it while the appeal is pending. But in the proposal that I made where we would begin the distribution, the loss to the victims in the criminal case is the amount of their, for the most part, the amount of their loss plus prejudgement interests. That prejudgement interest figure would not be included in this proposed distribution. Victims in the criminal case, and the other Amerindo investors, would be treated exactly the same. They would both be entitled to essentially the amount of money, without interest, that they lost.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Have you shared the names of the claimants that you have identified with the defendants or their counsel at this point?

MS. LEVIN: I believe that we have -- I believe that that information had previously been provided by Mr. Litt. And I believe that we had previously, the SEC had circulated their list. The information that I have is from the SEC's list. And I believe that they had previously provided the list of the investors, their list of who the Amerindo investors are.

JUDGE SWAIN: That was some time ago?

MS. LEVIN: Yes.

JUDGE SWAIN: And so will you -- are you willing and able to provide the current list to Mr. Vilar's counsel and to Mr. Tanaka promptly for their additions, corrections, or whatever?

MS. LEVIN: Absolutely. But I think that our issue that has been holding us up is not the actual list itself and who they are, but whether or not they're willing to agree to the condition for DOJ to distribute the money right now, or to begin the remission process, which is that in the event that the forfeiture is overturned on appeal, that they won't seek the money back from the Department of Justice.

We've just been unable to get an agreement or even an answer to that question. If so, we can move forward on that process. So that's what our hold up has been. I don't think there is really an issue with that they don't think that we have — the defendants or their counsel don't believe that we have a complete list because, as we said, we'll take whatever

names they give us and provide them. And we plan to put something up on the U.S. Attorney's Office website, which will be a reference to the case, and a sample petition, and an opportunity for anybody else that knows about it to file a —file a petition, as well. So the process should be very inclusive, that anybody that had money in Amerindo.

JUDGE SWAIN: So you would be going out to the last known address of the people identified, in addition to putting it up on the website?

MS. LEVIN: Absolutely.

JUDGE SWAIN: And this agreement that you are talking about, not to go backwards again, but the government is as to -- I think the figure is \$17 million for the preliminary distribution to be divided pari passu, or no?

MS. LEVIN: Yes, your Honor. But we would be perfectly comfortable in having all of the money distributed now, to have the final order of forfeiture entered, and the marshals to come in and liquidate the assets, everything, and distribute all of the money now. The reason why we ultimately came — I made the proposal of \$17 million, is there were issues with counsel about the amount of a forfeiture and what was the proper number, because that issue was on appeal. And because this is going through a forfeiture process, to avoid that whole issue. What I proposed was we just limit the money right now to \$17 million to enable at least some money to go

back to investors. And then with respect to the remaining money, you know, that can wait until the resolution of the appeal.

But the government's position is, with the entry of the final order of forfeiture, we're ready, willing, and able to begin the petition for omission or mitigation process. I called the Department of Justice this morning, the Asset Forfeiture Money Laundering Section to confirm that if we had this agreement from the defendants that they wouldn't seek the recovery of the money, that we could go forward under the petition for omission or mitigation process and distribute it. And I also confirmed that the general proposal, last value — you know, the most recent value on the last Amerindo statement would be an appropriate mechanism. And while they can't, without seeing a proposal they can't agree to it, it sounded, you know, generally acceptable to them.

JUDGE SWAIN: So that was back in the fall. And but since then you haven't had a definitive answer?

MS. LEVIN: No, no. I spoke to them this morning. I had a conversation in the fall. And then recognizing that times change and things could happen, I called to make sure this morning that I can accurately represent to the Court that the Department of Justice would not have -- you know, has indicated that they generally agree with this approach.

JUDGE SWAIN: All right. So, at this point, we'd like

to --

Well, Judge Sullivan, do you want to call on?

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Yeah, I was going to ask Ms. Shevitz,

or Mr. Tanaka, I mean just --

MR. JACOBSON: May I say one thing?

JUDGE SWAIN: Yes.

MR. JACOBSON: With all of the talk about whether the forfeiture order would be reversed later on and these assets would either revert, or not revert, it's the SEC's position, obviously --

DEFENDANT TANAKA: I am having difficulty hearing.

JUDGE SWAIN: Move the microphone over.

MR. JACOBSON: As stated, many of the investors --

JUDGE SWAIN: Mr. Jacobson speaking.

MR. JACOBSON: Right.

Many of the investors are in the SEC case. Our case was stayed up until about a year ago. We have been trying to resolve our case with the defendants and, hopefully, resolve all of the money issues as well before we move forward with either summary judgment or other disposition of the case. But it's certainly the SEC's intention, in the event that a forfeiture order is reversed and these assets become free, so to speak, that be would be seeking relief in the district court in the civil action, again, to restrain the assets, freeze the assets, if necessary seek the appointment of a receiver to be

able to then distribute those assets in the civil action.

So, in our view, under any circumstance, the moneys that are in the accounts, investor accounts, should be going back to those investors, regardless of the ultimate outcome of whether the forfeiture order itself is vacated or reversed or reduced.

JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: All right.

Ms. Shevitz, that was my understanding that there really was a consensus, at least at the time of sentencing, that the investors were entitled to get their money back and certainly the defendants were suggesting that the investors had been sort of put in a bad spot because of the freeze happening when it did.

MS. SHEVITZ: Absolutely.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: So it seemed like there was real consensus that we would identify investors, investors would get their money back, and if there was some little bit left over, then that might be what was the fight.

MS. SHEVITZ: I can tell you the problem. First of all, Mr. Vilar was not at Mr. Tanaka's sentence. So whatever you did at sentencing for Mr. Tanaka, Mr. Vilar was not there.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: No, what I just read before.

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Mr. Vilar was there. Because that

was before Mr. Vis sentencing. So what I just read was a quote from Mr. Colton, and that's at page 7 of the sentencing transcript.

MS. SHEVITZ: Well that's my point.

 $\,$ JUDGE SULLIVAN: $\,$ And after that, we sentenced $\,$ Mr. Vilar.

But in any event, my point is not that somebody is bound by something that was said there. It seemed there was a consensus that investors had to get their money back, they had been waiting a long time. And everyone, defendants and government, agreed that that should happen and should happen quickly.

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes. We would like the investors paid what they are due. We would like all of the claimants paid what they are due. However, we are not willing to give up total control of all the assets and all the, quote, substitute assets, so that the marshal service and the government can start playing with it, now, that they didn't do it for the last 6 years.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Can I ask you to define what you mean by "total control?"

MS. SHEVITZ: Total control means that what Ms. Levin wants to do is have a final order of forfeiture of \$54 million --

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Right.

MS. SHEVITZ: Now, your Honor, if you recall, agreed, that --

JUDGE SULLIVAN: No, I get all that. I'm just asking, what she is proposing is that, short of an order of forfeiture, that you folks agree and do not consent.

MS. SHEVITZ: On consent -- we would consent if we knew the universe of people, if we knew what the claims were -- which we have not been given this information. And, even today they say, oh, well maybe there is 20 or 30 people. That isn't good enough. Our clients are people and they still have continuing liability to all of the people who they have dealt with. And they do want to make them whole. But we're not getting the information. And what we have been getting is it's none of your business. And the fact is, it is our business. Right now, Ms. Levin says, well, we'll ask Mr. Tanaka and that's fine, but Mr. Vilar is there, too. He has a say.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I think the point is that you are representing Mr. Vilar for those purposes, it is not clear if Mr. Tanaka is representing himself for those purposes or whether he is being represented.

MS. SHEVITZ: Well, regardless, we have both asked, we have all asked for backup, for documents, for something. We don't have input. These defendants have not seen books and records since 2005 since they were kicked out of the business and the business was shut down. How do we know? We can say,

yes. That's what they want us to do, they want us to say yes.

And right now --

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I don't know what you want. So you are saying you want -- you want the names of the claimants they have identified --

MS. SHEVITZ: We want releases, too.

 $\,$ JUDGE SULLIVAN: $\,$ -- you want to know what the claims are of those persons.

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes. Of everybody. And who they contacted, how they contacted them. Because there are people who are — my client just told me that somebody contacted, through somebody else contacted them, and has a claim, and wanted to know who to talk to. Now, that person isn't contacted. So we don't have books and records. According to the government, we can't do anything, because we're barred from acting as anything. We can't anyway. And they don't want to give us any information. And they don't want to tell us the universe of people. And, today, six years after they shut the business down, they say maybe 20 or 30 others. That is not good enough.

JUDGE SWAIN: Well, Ms. Levin just agreed, earlier, that the government would provide you, Mr. Vilar's counsel, and also Mr. Tanaka, with their list of the universe of known claimants.

And will you include in that list, also, the last

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account balance that you are proposing to work off -- and this is a question I'm a asking Ms. Levin -- and the date to which that last account balance is attributed?

MS. LEVIN: Your Honor, we don't have that information. Let me explain. There may be a misunderstanding about what this petition for omission or mitigation process is.

This is a process the Department of Justice employs when assets are forfeited. And they're being used as compensation to victims of crime. And the way that the procedure works is that the victim -- and we consider the other Amerindo investors victims by virtue of the SEC action -- file a petition setting forth their loss, how they're a victim and they provide documentation as to what that loss is. And then the Department of Justice reviews it and accepts it or doesn't accept it. We do not have, right now -- we have not been running -- certainly, the U.S. Attorney's Office and SEC can speak for the SEC. But there hasn't been a receiver appointed. And we have not stepped in and been running the investment advisory business. We don't have the last statements for the account holders. Rather, we have a list of names and addresses. And under the petition for mitigation process, those people were given notice, and they will have an opportunity to submit the petition and provide their documentation. That information will be reviewed. My office will make a recommendation. And the investigating agency will

make a recommendation. And then the Department of Justice will decide.

The individual claimant, or petitioner, or victim, does not have to trace their, you know, their property into any particular account. They just need to show that they suffered a loss here.

So the universe of claims we won't know until everybody submits a petition. And that will be submitted to my office. We typically -- in fact, I can never recall a circumstance where defendants have been involved in that process. The defendants' interest in this property was forfeited from them by virtue of the substitute asset order. They have no legal right, title, or interest in the property. And what Ms. Shevitz is complaining about is the entry -- the final order of forfeiture we're seeking here is not for \$54 million. The Court has already entered that order and that order is on appeal. The order is a final order of forfeiture as to the specific assets listed in what was in the substitute asset order, so that the United States can have title to that property.

So, you know, that is how we would go about executing it. But in terms of will the Department of Justice agree that defendants, during the process we should provide all of the claim petitions for them for them to agree or to disagree to

the amount of the losses of their victims, I can't recall a circumstance where that has ever been done — of course, I can check with them. But that's not how the procedure typically works. This is not a bankruptcy proceeding. This is one where people who have suffered a loss can come in for relief from the government out of forfeited funds.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: But you said a moment ago you are not going to pay out on that until after the appeal issues, right?

MS. LEVIN: Yes, your Honor.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: So the issue here is what we can get done before the appeal is resolved. None of us know when that is going to be. And you have hit upon the fact that you need the consent or waiver from the defendants, right. And the defendants are saying we're willing to do that, maybe, if we get certain other information that allows us to know that we're not giving away or waiving something that might be significant. What is the downside to doing it this way? It's informal. It's not a requirement. It's an arrangement in order to get people, who are hurting and who have been waiting, something now when they might be able to use it actually.

MS. LEVIN: Okay, your Honor, first of all, it's twofold; there is two procedures here.

We can begin the process and we can -- DOJ can liquidate the assets and they can start ruling on the petitions without the consent of the defendants. What needs to happen is

the entry of the final order of forfeiture for the substitute assets. That has not been entered yet.

JUDGE SWAIN: All right, but that just got proposed in December, right?

MS. LEVIN: Yes, we refrained from doing it because we believed we can enter into, because there is an objection, there was an objection in July filed to the order of forfeiture when I advised counsel that I intended to get it. And we have been trying to work it out since then. But it was just submitted in December, the application for the final order of forfeiture. But that's one. The DOJ, once we have the final order of forfeiture, we can begin the petition process, sending out notice, notifying third parties, and they can submit their claims.

What we need the consent of the defendant for is to agree to release the money the claimants, to agree that the money be returned from them. I find it — I would have to check with the Department of Justice, the Attorney General has absolute discretion over the remission of forfeited funds. So I cannot imagine that as a policy matter the Department of Justice is going to agree to work in conjunction with the defendant reviewing them, particularly because our concern is that defendants are going to submit objections to certain claimants — you know, certain petitioner's claims. For example, victims that testified against them at trial. They

have an interest in — you know or the victims that are listed in the restitution order. And this is not a Court proceeding. This is not going to be resolved by the Court. This is within the Department of Justice at the discretion of the Attorney General. So we're essentially turning this into some kind of adversarial claims proceeding where the defendants that have been convicted of the crime and ordered to forfeit the funds are having a role in deciding which of their victims get how much money.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I think it seems to be an attempt to get passed an adversarial process to allow for parties to reach some agreement so that people can get paid sooner, rather than later.

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Because I think what you have said is that, unless there is agreement by then, you're not going to pay out until you get affirmed on appeal. Right?

MS. LEVIN: Yes, your Honor.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Yes. So the people who are waiting for their money, are not going to get a nickel until after the Court of Appeals decides, at the earliest.

MS. LEVIN: I understand, your Honor. And the only thing I can suggest is, perhaps, an alternative proposal. I do not imagine that the Department of Justice is going to agree to let defendants who have been convicted of the underlying

offense to have a role in deciding which claims are going to be paid. The only thing I can suggest, otherwise, is that the Court appoint a receiver, perhaps in the SEC action, and that the defendants agree to allow the receiver to distribute the money and maybe under that process the receiver has a say and I mean the defendants can have a role in that process. Because I think, as a policy matter, the Department of Justice is not going to agree to it. I can talk to them and discuss it, but it's their procedure, it's not the U.S. Attorney's office.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I understand that. But you're the one who is saying you want a waiver from the defendants. And they are simply saying, before they sign a waiver, they want to have a better understanding as to what exactly it is that you intend to do. It doesn't seem crazy.

MS. LEVIN: We told them exactly what we intend to do. What we intend to do is we intend to accept the petition, send notices to everybody that was an Amerindo investor, and to aggressively seek out the name of anybody else that the SEC doesn't have on their list and that while every Amerindo investor is entitled to recover the balance on their last statement, I believe the date was April of 2005. Whatever the April 2005 statement balance is, that's what they're entitled to.

JUDGE SWAIN: And you're looking to the investors to come forward with that statement balance, rather than saying

you have books and records that at this point reflect that 1 statement balance? 2 3 MS. LEVIN: Yes, your Honor. 4 The SEC may be able to --5 JUDGE SWAIN: Mr. Salzberg. And, then, after that, 6 we'll hear from Ms. Eiger. 7 JUDGE SULLIVAN: But I had winked at Ms. Shevitz, 8 because she was jumping up before. 9 JUDGE SWAIN: Ms. Eiger also wanted to speak. 10 MS. LEVIN: Your Honor, I'm a little bit baffled by, 11 we sort of don't understand what the point is of why the 12 defendant needs this information. I understand if we're going 13 to give broad parameters as to what we're doing, last 14 statement, every Amerindo investor is included, why the specific amount that is being paid to the Mayer family, versus 15 16 Robin Sayko, what difference does that make to the investors, 17 as long as we're stipulating that every Amerindo investor is 18 entitled to their balance as of April 2005. 19 JUDGE SULLIVAN: They just want to make sure that you 20 have got it right. I don't know --21 MS. LEVIN: We would --22 JUDGE SULLIVAN: Ms. Shevitz can speak for herself. 23 Mr. Tanaka can, too. 24 MS. LEVIN: Yeah, the point is that that assumes they

have a right to contest that amount.

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JUDGE SULLIVAN: No. No, but you made their waiver a condition on the early payment. If that's the condition that you have set, they don't have to waive. And if they have set some other conditions that they want met before they're going to waive, seems to me that's a negotiation, it's not about an adversarial process.

JUDGE SWAIN: It also seems to me that this is a somewhat -- I hope this is an unusual instance in which, through a forfeiture process, the government is seeking to take complete title to moneys that everybody agrees at some level belongs to investors, rather than to the defendants. because of the prior investment and fiduciary relationship, as Ms. Shevitz says there is, in addition to whatever restitution liability there may be in a criminal case, there is exposure of these defendants to follow on litigation to the extent the distribution of these funds is not consistent with the investor's position as to real ownership of or entitlement to the funds. So I think it seems to me that the way you pursued the forfeiture, you have walked into a situation that has wider implications then you might have if you know truly only sought the forfeiture of these defendants' specific personal right, title, and interest in whatever doesn't belong to investors. But that's where we are today. And I think the effort needs to be to make sure that there is a, you know, fair, rationale, documentable, and rapid -- insofar as we can do -- distribution

of the money that everybody agrees doesn't belong to Messrs. Vilar and Tanaka. And as Judge Sullivan says, the questions that are being asked here don't seem on their face irrational, given the type of situation that we're in and what you're proposing to do is negotiate an interim measure, and negotiations kind of go two ways.

MS. LEVIN: Your Honor, I just want to add one comment, which is that — or one clarification is, it is that the condition that we're imposing is not our condition, it is otherwise if the defendants do not agree, then in the event that the forfeiture is overturned on appeal, the United States government will be required to return that money to the defendants. And the United States government is not gonna be in a position where it's going to be, if money has been distributed to third parties, it is not going to be able to return the money to the defendants. So that's the reason why —

JUDGE SULLIVAN: No, I don't think it is saying that's a silly reason, I think we are saying if everybody shares the same goal, which is to get the folks who invested their money back, and quickly, it doesn't seem to be an insurmountable task, it doesn't, to me. So, I guess I'm not sure why we can't sort of work this out, and move towards that goal.

MS. LEVIN: Then I propose what I have mentioned, which is my alternative, which is that the Court appoint a

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receiver and that the receiver go through that process. Because I don't think that under the regulatory requirements of the petition for omission or mitigation process, that the Department of Justice is going to agree to this. Of course I can go back and ask them. But I think there is gonna be a huge obstacle to that, and I just want to raise the alternative that the government agrees to vacate the substitute asset order, and that the Court appoint a receiver and a notification to third parties, to the victims, and then liquidation of assets is done by a third party. We do not want to, in any way, block the victims and investors immediate access to their funds. And to the extent that the forfeiture order is getting in between that, we want to do what we can. But I don't think that under the regulatory scheme for petitions for omission or mitigation, this type of -- the proposal that I have recommended where it's the Department of Justice has absolute authority is one that I think they can do under the stipulated conditions. But I don't believe that it's going to one where they can do so in consultation with defendant. So just I want to raise the alternative.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: All right. Ms. Shevitz, you wanted to jump in a while ago.

MS. SHEVITZ: I don't know much about the crossover investment exactly that they did, but I'm told that this firm -- and I'm told by some of the people in the well, too,

that this firm had some very tricky kind of investment crossover -- I don't know what it's called here. But, in any event, the private securities which seem to be dismissed as not -- as irrelevant, are really relevant to the total pot, for one. And we agree that there should be somebody competent to evaluate the privates and figure out what there is for distribution.

I am told that that -- and I don't trust the marshals office to do that, frankly. And I don't know if anybody in this room would. But there is a firm, a specialist firm called Mooreland partners, who undertook a similar assignment for Amerindo UK trust in 2005. There are other people who do that. Nobody has wanted to consider this, because Mrs. Levin is stuck on having a liquidation and a remission process.

Now, if there should be no forfeiture, there should be no remission process. We object to the remission process, as well, on behalf of everybody because, A, we would like to know our own liabilities here. And, B, why should the Department of Justice have discretion to decide who to pay valid claims.

The problem is, we are willing --

You look confused.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Well, I mean I think why should the Department of Justice get to do this, they get to do this because there is a forfeiture order. I think the issue is what can we do quickly.

MS. SHEVITZ: Right. And what we could do quickly, because I read the transcript of the last SEC appearance which was sent yesterday by attachment. And I see that they are willing to move to withdraw the substitute forfeiture — substitute asset forfeiture order and, then, nobody would have to have go through this remission process. And, then, as the Court did with paying the amount to the Mayers back in 2008, seven, I don't know when it was; 2008 or 2009. We could agree to make some payments and it wouldn't have to have this remission process.

Now, I, on behalf of the investors I would want to argue for them that why should they have to go through a remission process and invoke the Department of Justice's discretion when, really, it's their money, to a large extent. And we're trying to figure out what it is. We're on their side, to an extent. But we don't want to be on their side and just have everything disappear.

Another problem with the substitute asset forfeiture order, as your Honor said when you said that there was a forfeiture that was \$36 million too high, that you would remedy that in the substitute asset forfeiture order, which you did not, with all due respect.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Well, they --

MS. SHEVITZ: In any event, there should only be a substitute asset forfeiture order to the extent of \$17 million.

1 JUDGE SULLIVAN: But they're proposing all of this, now, as part of an agreement, right? 2 3 MS. SHEVITZ: No, they are proposing --4 JUDGE SULLIVAN: Isn't that what you said, Ms. Levin? 5 MS. SHEVITZ: No, they're proposing to take 6 everything, start the marshals liquidating it, which includes 7 the privates, or else they are going to forget the privates, which they really shouldn't forget the privates, because people 8 9 here tell me that the privates are worth a lot of money. And 10 probably because the funds were not managed, and the privates 11 were not managed, they are sitting in a drawer. And somebody 12 didn't followup on warrants -- is that the words? 13 A VOICE: That's the word. 14 MS. SHEVITZ: Warrants that may have come due, or come up? 15 16 A VOICE: Expired. 17 MS. SHEVITZ: Expired. 18 JUDGE SULLIVAN: But Ms. Levin's point is that I 19 should sign the order, they have agreed they are going to start 20 distributing up to 17 million, and the rest will wait until the 21 Court of Appeals decides. 22 MS. SHEVITZ: No, the rest will be in the marshals' 23 hands. 24 JUDGE SULLIVAN: But if the Court of Appeals goes your 25 way on this, then the marshals hands give it back, right?

MS. SHEVITZ: Well, I don't know about that, but the point is --

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Why don't you know about that? That's what you said, right, Ms. Levin?

MS. SHEVITZ: Because they want it all.

MS. LEVIN: Yes, your Honor.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: No, she has just said --

MS. SHEVITZ: But the SEC then says if they get it all back, then they're gonna take it. I don't know under what theory, because if everybody is paid, everybody is paid. They want to extract blood, you know, if you don't agree, then we're gonna to go for super duper penalties and get more out of you. So we have an interest in retaining a little bit of control of how things are distributed, how things are evaluated. How things are evaluated, especially the privates and distributed. In all of this, we're willing to release money directly to the investors without this remission process.

JUDGE SWAIN: Well, let me come back in here and perhaps I have misheard something. But I'm going to first start with -- I mean explain the structure of what I thought I heard as two kind of different stages of proposal and ask Ms. Levin if I have misheard her. And to the extent I haven't, I am going to ask Ms. Shevitz and Mr. Tanaka to respond to the two levels.

What I thought I was hearing was that while the

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government's ultimate goal is to get the final order of forfeiture signed and go through the remission process, of which the Department of Justice and marshal service would have total control and which would require the liquidation of the private investments as an interim measure and in advance of the final signing of the final order of forfeiture, the government would be willing to have a pro rata distribution to all known and discoverable investors of \$17 million, which I am hoping you will tell me could be able to be covered by assets that are liquid now, and wouldn't require liquidation of the private investments, and that interim distribution would be conditioned on the defendant's agreement that essentially at least \$17 million of this, for sure, belongs to the investors. so, whatever happens with the final order of forfeiture process, the defendants would not seek to get the 17 million back from the government, would not say that 17 million didn't really belong to investors and was improperly distributed. in aid of that, the government would provide to defense counsel and to Mr. Tanaka the names of the people it believes with the SEC are in the universe of investors entitled to share in that, would vet that list with the defendants. And, then, what I think I'm also hearing, is also committed to doing, once the people have responded, would cap the claims of the investors for this distribution purpose at the amount of the last 2005 Amerindo statement, and would share out that \$17 million on

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that basis. And that would not require the Court to make a final decision on the proposed final order of forfeiture and would not require resolution of those issues, is that correct, Ms. Levin?

MS. LEVIN: Almost. Just a little -- there is one issue that we disagree with. Which is that in order for the assets to be liquidated for the marshals to take control of them and the Department of Justice to go through the petition process, there needs to be a final order of forfeiture. that final order of forfeiture has no consequence to the defendants. The order that they're objecting to is the 54 million-dollar order that is already final and it's already on appeal and it's going to heard by the Second Circuit. Nothing that we're doing here today is gonna change that. have the same arguments they are making. This is just -- the only issue here is, the substitute asset order forfeited the defendant's interest in those accounts listed there. No third parties have filed claims or petitions for those accounts. And what's left is for the United States to take title to that In order for the money to be distributed or for DOJ property. to go through the remission process, at least for the \$17 million, there needs to be a final order of forfeiture for that amount.

JUDGE SWAIN: So there is no way that we can put off to another day the issues with the final order of forfeiture

and have an agreement to distribute the 17 million on the basis that I described, with everybody reserving their rights as to everything north of, and around, the 17 million so that we can get the 17 million out with no commitment to try for clawback against the government?

MS. LEVIN: Well, there is two -- I mean there is sort of two -- there is sort of two ways that can happen.

One, that 17 million -- that issue, the 17 million versus 54 million, that issue is already presented to the Circuit. Nothing in the final order of forfeiture, whether it is entered or not entered, nothing is gonna change that. If the Court enters a final order of forfeiture, the defendant stands in the same position.

JUDGE SWAIN: I understand that that is your position and I also -- you know, I have got two defense counsel now jumping up to argue with you about that. And so what I'm asking is, is there a way to avoid having that debate, and just dealing with the \$17 million in a way that is sufficiently protective of the government's exposure to any potential claimback and is also sufficiently protective of the investors' rights and the process that is transparent as to the 17 million.

MS. LEVIN: There is two possible ways I can see doing that.

One, is to just have a final order of forfeiture for

\$17 million worth of cash. The Court just enters a partial final order of forfeiture for \$17 million from one of the various different accounts, and that is the money that is subject to liquidation -- or it's already liquidated, it is in cash anyway in the bank account. And then the other money, the other, you know, placements, whatever, remain in limbo.

The other alternative is, which the government would be agreeable to either one is, to the extent that Ms. Shevitz has concerns that the marshal service is not responsible and is not going to be able to — that they're untrustworthy, or the Department of Justice, we strenuously disagree. But we could agree that we'll have a third party appointed to manage the assets. However, the costs of managing those assets are going to have to come out of those assets themselves. But the government, for the purposes of — if that's the issue, in terms of the private placements, we could ask the Court to appoint a third party to, you know, take over the management of those assets if that's going to be the obstacle to, you know, to this agreement.

I guess a third alternative, which is that \$17 million, we just agree to vacate the substitute asset order for those, and those accounts are done outside the petition for omission process, and a third party is appointed to do that.

Those are my three alternatives.

JUDGE SWAIN: Okay.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I don't remember who was up between you first.

JUDGE SWAIN: Ms. Eiger.

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Mr. Friedman defers to Ms. Eiger.

MS. EIGER: I think there is a fundamental issue that we haven't addressed. And I think that we need to address it. And it explains why we need to know who the universe of investors are, what their claims are, and what the size of the pot is. And the reason is that a distribution based upon the last statement balance is fair to all investors, only if the pot is sufficient to cover all claims. Otherwise, it favors, even if the pro rata distribution is made, it favors the investors like the trial victim investors who have received moneys back over time, over investors who may have invested more recently and not received any moneys back. And the government, Ms. Levin, originally when we began talking about resolving this, recognized that one way to do it would be to determine what initial investments were, what investors got back, and to make some kind of equitable distribution in recognition of those factors. And then she determined, well, it was just too hard to do that. And the government then adopted, or then proposed, or pushed, or wants to use this last statement balance. But it creates a problem if the pot is not big enough to satisfy all investor claims. And since we don't have a list of the investors, we don't have an idea, a firm

idea of their claims, and we don't have an idea how big the pot is, the proposal, I think that we're at an impasse here. And that's, so far as Mr. Tanaka is concerned, Ms. Shevitz obviously has other issues, but that's the crux of our problem.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: So you're not going to sign a waiver, is what you mean without --

MS. EIGER: I don't think that we can reach an agreement without addressing that fundamental problem.

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes. How much is there. How much is in the privates, too. And who are all of the claimants. If they have not done it for now, but they have -- somebody has to do that.

Now, in the interim, I guess the only way the government would agree to do this, is if your Honor vacates the substitute asset forfeiture order. Because that would not -- that would I guess get rid of their need to do this, whatever it is they do in Washington.

JUDGE SWAIN: The remission proceeding.

MS. SHEVITZ: The remission proceeding.

But so I guess the trigger for that was the substitute asset forfeiture order, I don't know. I don't know why it seems form over substance. But we are willing to do some interim distributions, but we can't agree to waive things without knowing what the facts are.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: But the interim distributions, if we

went that route, would still require consent essentially, right?

MS. SHEVITZ: We would consent -- I mean this started with Mr. Begos' clients, the Mayers. And they needed some money. And, okay, this happened before, and everybody agreed to release some and they got some money. And we would agree to do that again and it would be a credit.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: But presumably only if you had full information that allowed you to know what --

MS. SHEVITZ: Well, I think that we probably could agree to some distribution now, of some small amount that would help to tide them over, if that's what they need, while all of this is going on.

JUDGE SWAIN: As I hear it, the waiver that is being requested is an agreement not to make a claim back against the government as to whatever the amount is that's distributed, claiming that the government shouldn't have given that money to investors, or any particular investors, that whatever the agreed interim distribution pool is, is gone, and has been distributed to investors, would you be --

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes, that's what happened before.

JUDGE SWAIN: And you would be willing to do that.

MS. SHEVITZ: If we know what the pot is. If we know what the claims are. And if we know that -- yes. Outside of forfeiture, yes. If it's outside of forfeiture, yes.

JUDGE SWAIN: If \$17 million or \$10 million, or whatever the number is, is taken out of the forfeiture process and distributed pro rata to claims that are submitted with a cap of the amount of the last statement — and I say that specifically because of the point Ms. Eiger raised, would defendants be willing to say that amount of money legitimately went back to people who were owners.

MS. SHEVITZ: I don't know about the last statement.

And I would have to talk to my client. And Mr. Tanaka is on the phone, but I don't think he should make an immediate decision, either, you know. But I think that the answer would be, yes, we want to see people paid, but we want to do it in an orderly way, and in a way in which we have some input because we have continuing liability. Not only here, but in life.

JUDGE SWAIN: But if we can get a basis for a proposed structure for further discussion and refinement and a deadline by which you have to get back to Judge Sullivan and me, I don't think that either Judge Sullivan or I would insist that everybody sign something on a dotted line today, but we want to see a time frame that everybody could understand and discussion set.

MR. FRIEDMAN: As I mentioned before, although I am sitting at the table otherwise populated by defense counsel, I do not represent any of the defendants, I represent the investors in ATGF, Amerindo Technology Growth Fund. Two of

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those investors are in court today, Mr. Marcus and Mr. Heitkoenig, I also represent Dr. Salvitti. And, together, my clients are the largest single group of investors in ATGF. And I believe they hold well over 90 percent of the total ATGF shares.

So while there may be 20 to 30 investors, most of the financial interest is my client's. And I feel, and I'm sure my client would echo this, I'm sitting here listening to this, and we are caught in a cross fire. Everybody in this room agrees, including your Honors, that the goal of the exercise is to get the money back to the investors as rapidly as possible. And, indeed, I sense that Judge Sullivan is concerned that very little has happened since sentencing, leaving the investors without any money. And some clients, like Mr. Begos' has had severe financial need. Mr. Heitkoenig has relatives that have that similar financial need. And yet all we here is carping back and forth between the government and defendants, and nothing is ever gonna happen. So I have an alternative suggestion. It somewhat mirrors what Ms. Levin said, but I must say that I came up with this idea before hearing Ms. Levin.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Do you have proof of that?

MR. FRIEDMAN: I have contemporaneous notes.

What I think makes the most sense is for your Honors to appoint a magistrate judge to supervise the distribution of

this money. And I do not see why any consent by defendants is relevant, because everybody agrees that this is not their money, that they held this money in trust.

In my letter to your Honors dated November 22nd, I quote from the appellate briefs of Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka in which they acknowledged that they held this money in a fiduciary capacity. If their convictions are reversed, I don't think that gives them any claim to money that was never theirs in the first place. I respectfully submit that the substitute forfeiture order did not give them any claim to assets that were never there in the first place. All that could be forfeited is whatever interest they had. And they had no interest in the ATGF funds, the ATGF 2 funds, or the JP Morgan Chase bank accounts that held assets of those entities. They are not investors, they don't claim to be investors in the funds.

If your Honors wanted to put that question to Ms. Shevitz and Mr. Tanaka, right now, I assume they would confirm what I am saying, because they already confirmed it in their letters and in their motion papers. So the way to break this logjam and get the money to the investors and dispense with the DOJ procedure and the fighting about consent, is to appoint a magistrate judge, assign to that magistrate judge the task of marshaling the assets and distributing the assets. And most respectfully, Judge Swain, I don't think there is any basis for

that to be limited to \$17 million. That should be all assets belonging to ATGF, ATGF 2 and GFRDA, which are the three, I'll call them, for shorthand, investor vehicles, in which the criminal defendants, Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka, have admitted that they have no interest, and all they had was title in a fiduciary capacity. I don't see why we are spending all of our time and your Honors' time talking about whether they will or will not give consent to the distribution of assets they never owned in the first place.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I think the problem -- Ms. Levin can speak for herself. The problem is the government is not going to distribute this until they have a final judgment from the Court of Appeals. Right?

MS. LEVIN: Yes, your Honor. But we are -- I mean I don't -- some of the mechanics of Mr. Friedman's recommendation I can't agree to. One, I don't think a magistrate judge necessarily has the authority to, like, liquidate assets and to do -- obviously, they can decide on the various different claims.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Not unless he's brokering a consent or waiver among the parties, right?

MS. LEVIN: But Mr. Friedman is actually right. The defendants don't have an interest. These are not their assets. They --

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Well, that's your argument. Your

argument is I should sign the proposed order and then you can 1 do what you are doing, but you're not going to pay a nickel out 2 3 until you hear from the Court of appeals, right? 4 MS. LEVIN: Yes --5 JUDGE SULLIVAN: Right? 6 MS. LEVIN: Yes. 7 JUDGE SULLIVAN: Yes. So that's not making you happy, 8 right? 9 MR. FRIEDMAN: No that's exactly what I object to. 10 MS. LEVIN: It's not that I won't, I can't. 11 JUDGE SWAIN: I'm not faulting you. I'm just saying 12 that is the practical reality, as far as you are concerned. 13 That is a constraint on you. 14 If Mr. Friedman's goal, and Mr. Begos' goal is to get their clients' money quickly, then there needs to be some sort 15 16 of broker process, it seems to me. 17 MS. LEVIN: Your Honor, no matter what we recommend, 18 is that a receiver be appointed who can do all of what Mr. 19 Friedman is suggesting, and what I said at the beginning is my 20 alternative proposal --21 JUDGE SULLIVAN: Which is the withdrawal of the --22 MS. LEVIN: Substitute asset order. 23 To allow those who don't want to stand in the way of 24 the --25 JUDGE SULLIVAN: Because there is no other way to get

this paid, absent a waiver or a consent of some kind from the defendants, right?

MS. LEVIN: Yes, absolutely. This would be the only other alternative. And the government is willing to seek to vacate the substitute asset order, and to allow the appointment of a receiver, and the receiver could handle all of these issues.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Just followup with that. What does that mean for the role of the defendants in that process?

MS. LEVIN: I mean, I --

JUDGE SULLIVAN: As far as you are concerned.

MS. LEVIN: Probably be something that the SEC can answer. What typically happens in an SEC proceeding about what the role is when a receiver is distributing assets.

MR. JACOBSON: Typically, the procedure is similar — not a remission process, but a receiver is appointed who has authority over the assets, the receiver comes up with a plan of distribution. Here, limited number of investors, have to be some type of claims process, which would be, again, similar to — maybe similar to remission process. You have to come up with a way to value each investor's claim. We have heard from defendants counsel that they may not agree exactly how to value an investor's claim. One says you could use the last statement. The other one says you have to look and see what was paid out over time, what was invested in, and come up with

a net claim. These are issues that come up a lot in SEC cases. And, typically, a receiver tries to look at whatever documents are available, claims that are available, and determine what is the most equitable way to distribute the assets. They then seek Court approval of the plan of distribution.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Right. And that will entail, potentially at least, then, rounds of briefing from everyone as to why this is not the right way to go, right?

MR. JACOBSON: Well, someone has to make a decision.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Not necessarily painless decision.

It's going to more a fast decision process. Is this receiver process going to be that much faster?

MR. JACOBSON: If people object to the way that the receiver determines how to distribute the money, then it won't be very fast, obviously. Plus, we have to go through the process of getting someone appointed, figure out how to get the assets under the civil court's control, perhaps, and the release and everything else. And we have to go back to the Commission to make sure we have authority to do that. That could take some time, although it is not, wouldn't take a year.

JUDGE SWAIN: Do these specific funds that Mr. Friedman has been talking about, the growth technology, ATGF funds and other specific funds that he named, have the private illiquid investments in them, as well cash?

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes.

MR. JACOBSON: I don't know.

MR. FRIEDMAN: They have basically three categories of assets, as I understand it. They have cash, significant amounts of cash, including one particular account that has \$21 million in it on the basis of the letter that the government wrote to the Court the other day. They also have publicly owned securities, publicly traded securities. They also have privately held securities.

Now if I can address the last issue for a moment.

There is a potential resource available to everybody in this room that has not been mentioned yet, and that is a person named David Ross.

Judge Sullivan may remember, David Ross was, as I understand it, and I was not there, but he was originally engaged by Mr. Tanaka. And he valued -- he is forensic accountant examiner type person. He valued the assets in the ATGF assets, using that as a catch-all broad phrase. He valued those assets as of September 30, 2009. He came to the conclusion that there was \$43 million plus in assets. He stated those conclusions in three letters addressed to Judge Sullivan that were sent in January.

In April of 2011, he confirmed, to me, his view that the assets were valued at September 30, 2009 as \$43 million. He has recently stated the view, to me, indirectly through Mr. Marcus, that the asset value, now, is about \$50 million.

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David Ross has done a very meticulous tracing of what privately held securities — or what companies whose privately held securities were owned by ATGF were involved in mergers and other corporate transactions such that those privately held securities were replaced by publicly traded securities.

Now, apparently, because nobody has been managing the ATGF assets, no one has ever made a claim for those publicly owned securities which are available to ATGF as the record owner, and which could be sold tomorrow.

There is work that has to be done. But what I am suggesting is a lot of it has been done by Mr. Ross. Mr. Ross is available, at a modest fee, to be retained by a receiver, or the Court, or a magistrate judge. And if I could just -- sounding like a broken record -- go back to the magistrate judge. Does not the Courts, and I guess I mean Judge Sullivan primarily in the criminal case have -- and maybe I mean both of your Honors -- have an inherent equitable power to do justice here to assign to a magistrate the task of distributing these assets. It would seem to me that's in the inherent equitable powers of the Court. And what I would suggest is, again, the consent of the defendants does not matter, because they do not have any interest in the assets. Their legitimate interest is to make sure that what's being distributed are assets of ATGF, and not their apartments or pension plans or resources, some of the other subjects covered

by the forfeiture order. But they do not have an interest in ATGF assets. And by way of response to Judge Sullivan's question, I think that may make the distribution process an awful lot faster. If there aren't going to be any objections from the defendants because they don't have standing because they don't have an ownership interest, I don't think it's a very complicated process.

And in other words --

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I would be curious to hear from Ms.

Levin whether she thinks the Court has the inherent power to

just start dividing up assets and ordering payments. I think I

know what you're going to say, but --

MS. LEVIN: The one way that the Court could do it is under the -- what initially happened when we filed a substitute asset order, was that we sent notice to, you know, published notice. And a few claimants, a few Amerindo investors filed petitions. They ultimately withdrew them to allow the money to be distributed under the petition process. But the Court could invite all Amerindo investors to submit petitions. And then the Court, and the Court could appoint a magistrate judge, to just divide up among the Amerindo investors how much they were entitled to get out of the substitute assets.

Typically, they wouldn't have standing, because you have to have an interest in a specific asset. But in light of what's going on here, the government isn't going to make that

objection. And the government will allow, if the Court chooses, to have -- you know, won't object to it. And, you know, a magistrate judge could decide the issue of what the amount of each investor is entitled to.

The issue of -- I don't think that a magistrate judge has the authority to sort of step out of the courtroom and actually liquidate the assets or manage the assets. I think that a third party is gonna need to come in and ultimately be that distribution agent to do that. I don't think the Court can open up a bank account, and liquidate the assets, put the money in there. That's typically what a receiver does.

JUDGE SWAIN: Seems to me it would require a receiver or special master, or be done to some devolution to the civil side.

THE COURT: Did you want to be heard?

MR. BEGOS: I do think I have an answer to how this can be done. But before I get there, I do just want to say everything that we have been talking about today involves months. It involves taking significant amounts of money, figuring out who gets what, deciding who is going to make the determination, everybody gets to weigh in, and money gets distributed. My clients don't have months. They don't have medical insurance. They have medical problems that they have not been able to deal with.

Dr. Mayer is literally dying, and they don't have

money to bury him, if and when he does die. Their house is in foreclosure. They can't afford to heat it. My clients are literally almost out on the street. And they don't have months. And so the number one priority I have today is to try to get a documented agreement, today, that they get money to survive the months that all of this other process, however it ends up looking, will take. And I do have an issue if it doesn't happen today, because I have spent the last 2 years begging the defendants' lawyers to do something.

After the last SEC hearing before Judge Swain in September, I wrote to defendants because they had told Judge Swain, as they said here today, they don't object to money being distributed, they don't object to some special distribution to people like the Mayers who are in desperate situation. I wrote to them in September and asked them for money, and didn't hear one word back from them, other than a cursory, we'll talk to our clients and get back to you.

So I have a very — the only time they agreed to give money was when there was something in it for them. Before the sentencing, they agreed to give \$150,000 to the Mayers. I have a real concern that if we walk out of here today without something on the record saying, however it's documented, the Mayers can get some money to survive for the next two, three, six months, whatever it may be, we're not going to get it.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Well, you're not going to get it

unless there is a waiver from the defendants that the government is prepared to consider a green light and to start distributing money, right.

MR. BEGOS: They did agree -- what Ms. Shevitz said was they were agreeable, at least on Mr. Vilar's behalf to doing something like was done back in 2009 where \$150,000 was distributed to the Mayers. I would like more, because \$150,000, it's a lot of money, but it's not gonna do a lot for them in the situation that they're in right now. But there was a -- there was just a simple stipulation that was signed by the parties, it was signed by your Honor, that resulted in the direct wiring of money from Bear Stearns to the Mayers.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Right. No, I remember that. But that if we do that, if I we withdraw the prior order, then it requires basically consent, right, Ms. Levin, that's your --

MS. LEVIN: No, your Honor, we don't --

JUDGE SULLIVAN: No?

MS. LEVIN: We would need the defendant's consent to release that amount of money.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Right.

MS. LEVIN: But the government will agree --

JUDGE SULLIVAN: But still requires some consent.

MS. LEVIN: Yes.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: The issue is are the defendants prepared to consent for the really small, relatively small

amounts, designed to help alleviate drastic situations for 1 2 people. 3 MS. SHEVITZ: We have said that repeatedly, yes. 4 Mr. Begos says to me, I didn't give him any money? How could I 5 do anything with this? MR. BEGOS: I wrote an e-mail to Ms. Shevitz. 6 She 7 said she would speak to her client, never got back to me. 8 JUDGE SWAIN: Let's not go back --9 MS. SHEVITZ: There is nothing I can do. 10 JUDGE SWAIN: Let's not go back there, I want to 11 ask --12 MS. SHEVITZ: But, yes, we would agree to a 13 distribution --14 MS. EIGER: I would --15 THE REPORTER: Hold on, I didn't get that. 16 JUDGE SWAIN: So just for the record, Ms. Shevitz 17 said, yes, we would agree to a distribution to tied them over. 18 Ms. Eiger said as would we. 19 MS. EIGER: Yes. 20 JUDGE SWAIN: Mr. Begos, what are you looking for in 21 terms of an amount that would, say, take them through immediate 22 expenses in the next 6 months. 23 MR. BEGOS: For the next six months, your Honor, what 24 I had asked for in my e-mail to Ms. Shevitz and to Ms. Eiger's

firm, I went through the mortgage arrears that they had. And

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this is actually attached as -- it's part of the e-mail chain that is attached to the final exhibit, Exhibit E of Ms. Levin's January 8, 2012 letter. It's really the last two pages of that document.

There are mortgage arrears, there are tax arrears, utility arrears.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: What's the bottom line.

MR. BEGOS: The bottom line to get them on sound footing and be able to get them through the next six to 12 months, was \$2.8 million.

MS. SHEVITZ: No.

MR. BEGOS: The monthly expenses that they have, going forward, approximately -- I mean they have a hundred thousand dollars of repairs they need to do on their house they have not done, leaking roofs.

JUDGE SWAIN: What is necessary to stop the foreclosure proceedings, pay medical expenses and, you know, that absolutely positively needs to be done within, say, the next 6 months. What's that number.

MR. BEGOS: To stop the foreclosure proceeding my estimate is that it would require paying the mortgage arrears, which is \$800,000 approximately.

JUDGE SWAIN: And living expenses on top of that, and provision for potential funereal expenses would add, what?

MR. BEGOS: Future mortgage payments, \$17,000 a month.

Insurance, utilities, food, real estate taxes, approximately \$28,000 per month. The necessary repairs were approximately \$81,000.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: That includes medical expenses, according to your e-mail, right?

MR. BEGOS: Correct, your Honor.

JUDGE SWAIN: Would the repairs include medical expenses?

MR. BEGOS: Yes. Necessary repairs and anticipated medical expenses was \$81,000. I also had a couple of other numbers in there, past due real estate taxes, utilities, and so forth, as well as taxes that they would be paying on whatever money is distributed to them. Obviously they can make do with less, but I did try to give as accurate a number as I could so we were not in another situation in three months or six months coming back and going through the process again.

JUDGE SWAIN: And so these are figures, the future expense figures are on a 24 month basis, so that 408,00, and 672,00, and 81,000 are on a 24 month basis?

MR. BEGOS: The \$28,000 is per month. The 17 -- yes, your Honor, that is correct, that's on a 24 month basis.

JUDGE SWAIN: And the 1.2 million,

1.16 million-dollar number under past due amounts would be amounts that are necessary to stop the mortgage foreclosure proceedings and cure the arrears on real estate taxes and

things like that?

MR. BEGOS: That's correct. It's my assumption that if and when the past due mortgage payments were paid, that the bank would de accelerate the mortgage and stop the foreclosure proceeding. I actually have no guarantee about that, but. You know, I prefer to pay off the mortgage but, obviously, that is not gonna be in the cards right now.

JUDGE SWAIN: So the first -- that first group is 1.16 million dollars. The second group, the 24 month figure, is a little over -- looks like a little over million dollars. I didn't look at the income tax figure. That is 500,000 estimated on a distribution. There is no return of principle argument there? I mean you are assuming that this is all taxable as long term capital gains at 15 percent on some much larger number?

MR. BEGOS: I believe that is the assumption, your Honor, although I'm not a tax lawyer, I didn't calculate that number. But I believe that is the assumption.

JUDGE SWAIN: Well, to the extent we're going to go down that road, I think you need to revisit that assumption if this is essentially besides the \$150,000, the first amount coming out.

But let me just sort of offer up a plug figure here for arrears and say six months. If what we're talking about is, I'm going to call it \$1.8 million.

1 MS. SHEVITZ: That's a lot of money. JUDGE SWAIN: I know that's a lot of money. What is 2 3 the overall amount of the claim, I'm sure it is in here somewhere, but I don't have it, of the Meyers' claim. 4 5 MR. BEGOS: Principle is about \$11 million dollars that was invested, all cash in 2000. It was by rollover from a 6 7 maturing investment, matured in 2003. And there is approximately \$7 million in interest. So the total number that 8 9 was in the restitution order is about \$18 million. Of that, 11 10 point something is principle, so we're talking --11 JUDGE SWAIN: The interest is prejudgement interest? 12 MR. BEGOS: Prejudgement interest, yes, your Honor. 13 JUDGE SWAIN: So we're talking original investment 14 amount of 11 million. There is the plug figure of about 1.8 is 15 roughly 15 percent of that principle investment amount. MR. BEGOS: Correct, your Honor. 16 17 JUDGE SWAIN: Before I higher from the shaking heads 18 at the defense table, I want to ask the government, do the government and SEC believe that there will be sufficient, in 19 20 terms of the assets that are known, to pay all investors at 21 least 15 cents on the dollar? 22

MS. LEVIN: Yes, your Honor. We do believe that there are sufficient funds to pay each investor 15 cents on the dollar.

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JUDGE SWAIN: And so then my question would be if

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there were an agreement to carve out \$1.8 million from the substitute assets order, obviously to be credited against any, you know, additional claim by the Mayers, against funds to be distributed, would the defendants agree to permit the distribution of that carved out 1.8 to the Mayers under an agreement that the defendants would not seek to hold the government liable for improper distribution of the 1.8. And then, of course, for the rest of the investors and for the health and ultimate termination of this process, I would want to walk away today with some sort of structure that people are supposed to be discussing among themselves, whether that's magistrate, special master, or some other -- or a receiver, because there would have to be some sort of expert involved in liquidation and valuation. And our magistrate judges are wonderful judicial officers, but they are not financial experts or bankers or anything else. But leaving that aside for a minute, I would like to focus on the 1.8. And I see Ms. Shevitz and Ms. Eiger consulting with each other. And I know Mr. Tanaka has been very patient and quiet on the phone here, but I would first like to hear from counsel in the courtroom. MS. SHEVITZ: We really don't have the figures to really test it out. And I mean what comes to mind, now, is if

MS. SHEVITZ: We really don't have the figures to really test it out. And I mean what comes to mind, now, is if this money is not gonna, for sure, stop the foreclosure, why are they still living in this house, frankly.

MR. BEGOS: They can't sell it. It is in foreclosure,

and it is not worth what the bank wants for it.

MS. SHEVITZ: There is probably other ways to mitigate this but, you know, I just don't want to come to a situation where other people clambering for money, and these folks got 1.8. I don't know.

MS. EIGER: It's A larger number than I contemplated as a hardship distribution. I would at least like to have an opportunity to confer with my client.

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes. I would have to speak with my client, too.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: The e-mail is a long time ago, right? September 27th.

JUDGE SWAIN: They asked for 2.8 million in September, knocked it down by a million.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: You haven't talked to your client about this request from Mr. Begos?

MS. SHEVITZ: No. We had this major -- initial problem that they were not gonna let us agree to anything without a total forfeiture. That was it.

JUDGE SWAIN: Okay, well, we --

MS. SHEVITZ: There was no negotiation or agreement to do anything like this. We said we would be willing to. And, no, after that, there was no reason to talk to the clients of that specific amount of a carveout, because Ms. Levin has repeatedly taken the position that we're not going to do that

at all, she's going to do the remission proceeding and that's 1 it. And we had no interest in saying anything. So, that's 2 3 why. 4 JUDGE SULLIVAN: How long do you think it would take 5 you to confer with your clients and get back to the Court with 6 respect to that specific request, 1.8 million. 7 MS. SHEVITZ: Well, we could do that. I guess I could 8 do a phone conference at Fort Dix. Although the Court might 9 have to expedite that, because I hear that there is a 10 problem --11 JUDGE SULLIVAN: That's fine, but you think end of the 12 week? 13 MS. SHEVITZ: Let's say next week. 14 JUDGE SWAIN: Next Monday? JUDGE SULLIVAN: Monday is Martin Luther King. 15 JUDGE SWAIN: Next Wednesday, the 18th. 16 17 MS. SHEVITZ: Yes, I could definitely talk to them by 18 then. 19 JUDGE SWAIN: Ms. Eiger, would you talk to Mr. Tanaka 20 by the 18th? 21 MS. EIGER: I can. 22 MS. SHEVITZ: I kind of would like to hear all of the 23 other people.

behalf of your client, you said some of your folks are

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I was going to ask Mr. Friedman, on

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destitute. Are they as destitute as that. I feel like George
Bailey at the end of the story, what do you need States to tide
you over.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I do not want to get into a contest of sob stories. And I don't want to minimize the mayors' position.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Right.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I can tell you that Mr. Heitkoenig who, if the Court would agree, can address the Court directly, has an uncle -- cousin in Haiti who has already been foreclosed on and is destitute. And Mr. Heitkoenig's investment is on behalf of that cousin.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: How much?

MR. FRIEDMAN: I don't know the numbers. Would it be okay for Mr. Heitkoenig to address --

JUDGE SWAIN: Talk to Mr. Heitkoenig.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Okay.

MR. BEGOS: Would it be possible to have some amount of money cleared today while defense counsel are talking with their client. Presumably there is an amount of money that they would agree to. And then they can discuss with their client the \$1.8 million, get back to all of us in the court. But they should be able to agree to some amount of money today.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I'm not sure that Ms. Shevitz can, without conferring with her client. Do you think so,

Mr. Begos?

MR. BEGOS: Well, she did tell me back in September she was conferring with her client.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: With respect to a particular number? I don't know, if she has had this conversation, and her client has authorized her to consent to some number, then I guess she might be in a position to do this. But absent that kind of communication, I think she might have trouble pulling the trigger on something today, don't you think.

I understand your concern, but I'm just not sure how she can responsibly agree to something without running it by her client.

MR. BEGOS: I understand. And I have a feeling that next week we're going to hear no. And, then, I'm not sure where we're gonna be, and I'm not sure where my clients are going to --

JUDGE SWAIN: Well, the response, next week, needs to be a response to the 1.8. And if there is an issue with the 1.8, since there has been an agreement for some time in principle that some tide-over amount is appropriate, there needs to be a specific other number with a justification for the other number. And that number would need to be in at least six figures.

MS. SHEVITZ: Well, Judge, we can't really do a total justification for some other figure, again, without --

JUDGE SWAIN: I understand that.

MS. SHEVITZ: So, last time, the defendants agreed to \$150,000. So, in my mind, I was thinking in terms of something like that. So this is a huge difference. And if the government is agreeing to this, too -- I would like to know what the government is agreeing to, and what their basis is --

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I think they are inclined to agree to anything you are willing to agree to; right, Ms. Levin?

MS. LEVIN: We want the money to go back to the victim, and we're willing to, in any way that we can possibly do, to facilitate that process. We want to do it. And, unfortunately, we're hampered by what we can do under the petition process and what we can do under the forfeiture law. But as long as it's legally permissible, we're in favor of doing it.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Ms. Shevitz, you're not suggesting that the Mayers are not entitled to, you know, more than a couple of hundred thousand dollars, right. There is no dispute that they invested a lot of money, that they are entitled to get that money back, and it's in the millions, right?

 $$\operatorname{MS.}$ SHEVITZ: To what extent in the millions is an issue, but, yes.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: But north of 1.8.

MS. SHEVITZ: I would say that's probably true.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: So, again, I just don't think that is

that much --

MS. SHEVITZ: I defer to Mr. Tanaka on that issue.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Okay. Well, if Mr. Tanaka wants to speak, I guess he can, but he may want to confer with counsel, first.

JUDGE SWAIN: Mr. Tanaka, are you still there?

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Yes.

JUDGE SWAIN: I think Mrs. Eiger is going to be in touch with you very promptly, so I won't put you on the spot.

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Maybe if it is --

JUDGE SWAIN: Mr. Tanaka, Mr. Tanaka. The court reporter is still having trouble hearing you clearly, so please speak as slowly and as loudly as you can.

Thank you.

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Thank you. I'm saying that the Mayers have been our clients for 20 years. And in the interests of equality for all our clients, and knowing what I know about the Mayers, I'm not as sympathetic as is the Court is, because for the simple reason that, for example, Mr. Friedman's client, Paul Marcus is 84 years of age, has not received a penny, hasn't been saying anything. I am sure he would like to see a penny or two in next year or two.

What I know about the Mayers is their personal spending habits have given them troubles for 20 years. And at one time, as I point out to the New York State Court, they

received a hundred thousand dollars, tax free, which still didn't tide them over. So they have been having problems for all of 20 years that I have known them.

On top of that, in this particular case, they've had a civil suit in New York State court and, basically, what I think they're doing is trying to jump the queue on other investors, and I'm not very sympathetic about that. They wanted to have, what I said was a grab and run, where they get a judgment in New York State Court ahead of other investors. So, therefore, I am not particularly sympathetic of the Mayer situation ahead of anyone else.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Well, I mean I don't know that it requires sympathy, necessarily, it require agreement to have that money --

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Don't forget, they have a payment to them which no one else has gotten.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: But, again, I think the issue is can you and Mr. Vilar agree that some amount of money would go sooner, rather than later, to the investors, including the Mayers.

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Well, looking at their letter, the figure was somewhat north of \$2 million, I said to myself, this is really injustice, looking at other investors. Why should they have such a huge lump sum ahead of time, especially since they already had a prior payment.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: All right. Mr. Friedman, did you want to --

MR. FRIEDMAN: I did. I have an answer to your Honor's question and a comment.

With regard to Mr. Heitkoenig's cousin in Haiti, he informs me that \$50,000 would tide that person over. \$50,000 goes a lot further in Haiti than it does in the United States as we all could recognize.

The other point I want to make is with regard to Mr.

Marcus, who is the person I am pointing to. He doesn't look

it, but he is in his eighties. He and his family are the, as I

understand it, the largest single investor in ATGF, with four

to \$5 million -- I think that's right, close to \$5 million

worth of investments. As Mr. Tanaka just said -- Mr. Tanaka

actually said it as well or better than I could say it. Mr.

Marcus has never gotten a penny. Now, I cannot in good

conscience claim that Mr. Marcus is destitute, because he is

not. So I'm obviously not going to stand up here and talk

about his need for money. But what I can stand up and talk

about is fairness.

If the Mayers are going to get 500,000, a million, 2 million, Mr. Marcus owns a much greater interest than the Mayers do in ATGF. And we're talking about ATGF funds. So there has to be some basic equity if there is going to be an interim — on the interim distribution; in other words, a

distribution today, or tomorrow, or next week. I don't think it is appropriate for only the Mayers to be considered. And I don't even think it's appropriate for only the Mayers and Mr. Heitkoenig's cousin in Haiti to be considered. Other investors have to be considered as well.

JUDGE SWAIN: Are the ATGF funds the only source of liquidity here? I'm asking the government.

MR. NAFTALIS: They are all lumped together. The ATGF, plus the private clients' GFRDA funds are all in the same basket, all of the different kind of private accounts are in the same bank accounts. So, yes.

MR. FRIEDMAN: And I would just add that there are two accounts which account for 24 million, plus. And I guess Mr. Naftalis' comment goes primarily to those two accounts, because that's where most of the money is. And I was reading from the government's letter of December 30 to your Honors.

TUDGE SWAIN: Well, I hear the equity point. I hear the delay points, which are compelling all of the way across the board. But the specific requests that are being made now are requests are being made on the representation that it's keeping somebody within their threshold while we work out the larger interim distribution issue. And it gets more complicated and more delayed to the extent that we try to work out some sort of proportional thing for a very small amount of money and then have to revisit that sort of mechanism in what I

hope, intend, and anticipate will be a short period of time in dealing with something that is like \$17 million. And so my -- one second, let me just consult with Judge Sullivan.

(Pause)

Before we are specific about what has got to be in this universe of desperation situations, I see there are a couple of other counsel standing, are there other investors whose representatives today want to inform the Court of what they would contend are desperation situations on the order of the ones that have been identified on behalf of the Mayers and Mr. Heitkoenig's cousin?

MR. HALL: Thomas Hall. I represent one of the investors, Robin Sayko.

Extent to which her financial hardship may or may not exist.

But I can state that I know my client's recently gone through a divorce. And I would welcome the opportunity that if we're gonna address these things on a sort of ad hoc basis to put forth what, you know, her financial situation is, because I believe she does have significant needs, as well. But I can't stand here and represent to your Honors this afternoon as to what her mortgage arrears are or anything like that. But I would welcome the opportunity to do that if we could.

Secondly, and I don't know whether your Honors want me to be heard on the other issues, the process issues. But as I

sat here and listened to all of this, in my mind it sounds like the type of thing that is done in bankruptcy court all of the time, where you have a universe of creditors or claimants, you set a bar date, people come in, they set put forth their claims, and you have a receiver or magistrate or somebody who is gonna make a determination on those claims, and you have a process where people can object. Whether that is Vilar or And I recognize the argument that maybe they don't have standing to object because it never was their money to begin with. But I, frankly, don't understand and, you know, taking the lawyer hat off the client certainly doesn't understand why, after 6 years, six and a half years, there is still this logjam and this money is going nowhere. So I would greatly urge this Court, both of your Honors, to put some sort of process in place. And it sounds to me like this remission process is not going to work. And I think some sort of -again, something similar to what is done in bankruptcy court all of the time. But let there be a bar date, let's finalize the universe of claimants. We're now 6 years since the accounts have been shut down. I would think everybody has come forward who is gonna come forward, and let's have somebody make a determination on the claims.

Thank you.

JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you.

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MR. WRIGHT: Yes, good afternoon, I'm Timothy Wright, I'm counsel for Peter Lusk, who is sitting right there.

And I would like to make just a few points to the Court, if I could.

First, there are certain assets that are comprised of the pension assets, for example, that are out of the universe of Amerindo investors. Or that is my understanding.

In the case of my client, Mr. Lusk, he was part of three people who lent Alberto Vilar sufficient moneys to make his bail. Mr. Vilar then asked Mr. Lusk if he would convert those funds to enable him to hire defense counsel in his criminal case. He subsequently lent additional money to Mr. Vilar. Mr. Lusk has a claim against Mr. Vilar in his individual capacity. We are contemplating bringing an action to seek a judgment. And if the broad scope of the substitute asset order puts in jeopardy, in our view, assets that should be available to satisfy the individual claims of Mr. Vilar, which are separate and distinct from claims of investors in the Amerindo funds.

JUDGE SWAIN: You said the individual claims of Mr. Vilar, you mean -- did you mean the say the individual claims of Mr. Lusk?

MR. WRIGHT: I'm sorry, yes, of Mr. Lusk.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: He is an investor, or he is not an investor?

MR. WRIGHT: He is not an investor. He individually and separate and distinct to the Amerindo funds, lent money to Mr. Vilar to assist him in his defense in the criminal action and now he has a claim against Mr. Vilar, personally, for the return of the funds that were lent to him, to Mr. Vilar.

JUDGE SWAIN: So these are funds that were lent after the commencement of the prosecution, and not funds that are contended represent moneys held in a fiduciary capacity. It's a general unsecured claim as against Mr. Vilar's personal right, title, and interest in whatever he has a right, title, and interest in?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, that is correct. And the reason I am here today is, as I understand it, the very broad scope of the substitute asset order, means that all of Mr. Vilar's funds are basically subject to forfeiture. And we have an interest in seeing this Court administer the fund properly, pay back the investors. We would hope that there will be an excess left over that will be subject to a claim by Mr. Lusk against Mr. Vilar. So we have an interest in seeing that the private securities are, the value of those private securities are maximized to the extent possible. And we have no concern or claim about investor funds being paid back to investors, but we are concerned that investor funds and personal funds are not commingled to the detriment of there being no possibility for an excess reverting back to the defendants.

process should have the opportunity for people to make whatever kind of claim it is, explaining the type of claim it is, and also the opportunity for, for instance, the government to object that its forfeiture claim — to talk about priority of claims, the government might take the position that a forfeiture claim comes ahead of a post prosecution claim, but I don't think it is necessary to deal with the resolution of that up front in connection with the question of how to get investor money back to the investors.

So as long as you have an opportunity to make that claim as against the amount targeted for ultimate forfeiture and, you know, whether that's in a remission process or whatever, does that satisfy your concerns, that you are not shut out of that process of claimsmaking?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, that would satisfy our concerns, your Honor thank you.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Is the government aware of Mr. Lusk's claim?

MS. LEVIN: Yes, your Honor. That's a separate issue in terms of the substitute asset order that really doesn't go to the heart of this. But in the petition for omission or mitigation process, anybody — if we were to go through with that procedure, anybody that feels they have a claim to this money is entitled to submit a petition. And DOJ follows, I

have provided in the letter that I sent, a copy of the federal regulations which governs who is entitled to, you know, assert a claim to that money. So that would be covered. And of course if the Court chooses the other option, which is to have a receiver or special master appointed to do that, then the Court can set, you know, a mechanism for anybody that had a claim to the money to submit a claim.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: All right, thank you.

Can I ask you a question, if the Court of Appeals ruled tomorrow in your favor, Ms. Levin, how long would it take to get money paid out to the investors?

MS. LEVIN: Well, if the Court entered the final order of forfeiture as to the substitute assets -- and, again, just to be clear, it's only a final order of forfeiture for those assets.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I get that. You're not going to pay out anything until you hear from the Court of Appeals.

MS. LEVIN: We can't pay out anything--

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Right. Let's say I signed the order today, you get the Court of Appeals ruling tomorrow, how long could it take for anybody to get paid?

MS. LEVIN: We are going to start the process of evaluating the petitions right way so that presumably the day that the Court of Appeals decision comes out, that next day we can start distributing the money. It would take a while to

review the claims, usually takes about 6 months. Notice.

People submitting claims.

MR. FRIEDMAN: That six-month clock is not gonna start ticking until the final order is signed, as far as you are concerned.

MS. LEVIN: Yes. The final order of forfeiture can be signed prior without any waiver from the defendants. The final order of forfeiture can be signed now. What can't be done is the distribution of money.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I understand. I'm just asking for an assessment of how time consuming it is to do what you have proposed doing, with the marshal service and Department of Justice.

MS. LEVIN: It is about, I would say, 6 months to a year. We would obviously ask them the expedite it as quickly as possible.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: That's if the Court of Appeals ruled tomorrow.

MS. LEVIN: For the money, yes.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Okay.

MS. LEVIN: No, your Honor, it's whatever period of time it is. If the Court of Appeals rules -- yes, if the Court of Appeals rules tomorrow, but while the Court of Appeals is deciding the issues being briefed, we'll be working all this time.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I see. And the receiver would be faster or slower, in your view.

MS. LEVIN: The only difference in the receiver, two reasons why we have not pursued this receiver option before was, one, because of the expense associated with it. And that was the main reason. The benefit to the receiver is that I believe that if the Court appoints the receiver and the claimants agree, that they can — the receiver can distribute the money immediately. But I'm not really clear. I mean I guess it would be done through the SEC proceeding, whether or not the defendants — there is any issue with defendants needing the defendants consent, I think the SEC could probably —

JUDGE SULLIVAN: They could make claims, like anybody else.

MR. JACOBSON: Usually when we have a receiver, we have -- it's a situation where we go in, seize assets, get a freeze, the receiver takes control. And then they propose a plan. People can object. The defendant might be able to object. But usually when we have a judgment in place, it sets the amount of disgorgement. So we can take the assets, satisfy the judgment, and then distribute the money. In this situation where it would be consensual, I think, you know, assuming we could have a receiver put in place, we would obviously need the same type of consent from the defendants that they would

relinquish any claim to the assets before they can become subject to the Court's jurisdiction. And once it is clear that the receiver has the jurisdiction over those assets, the process can take a very short time, or a longer, depending on the number of people who object and the nature of the objections. So it could be very short. I don't know, I don't think the claims process, 30 creditors, and maybe a few more, that should not take more than a few months, I mean, normally.

JUDGE SWAIN: Well, you're proceeding is name the corporate entities for the business entities in addition to the defendants.

MR. JACOBSON: Correct.

JUDGE SWAIN: Does it name these -- the growth technology fund and the RDA fund?

MR. JACOBSON: I think it names any potential defendant that could have been -- that might have their name on the account or any funds that might be available to investors would be the names that are on the --

JUDGE SWAIN: If we were to go down this road and focus on the, you know, for some number in the eight digits on the accounts that have funds attributed to those funds in them, and if the representation of Mr. Friedman that neither Mr. Vilar nor Mr. Tanaka had any personal interest in those particular funds, would it be feasible then to put in receiver as to those funds which are not being managed, and make the

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process move faster than it would if we're looking at amounts that are potentially titled to the individual defendants who are active.

MR. JACOBSON: With respect to the -- my understanding is that most of the funds are in the names of account for the funds, and not the individuals. I think most of that's what we're talking about. The private -- all of it, as far as the government knows, all of the assets that actually have, or all of the accounts that actually haves assets in them, belong to the funds and not the individual.

JUDGE SWAIN: And did you serve at the beginning of this proceeding, these funds in some way -- I think where I'm going is, is there a position that there is, you know, default as to the claim of entitlement of the investors.

MR. JACOBSON: The complaint was served and the amended complaint was served on defendants and the entities through the defendants because they were the representatives of all of the entities at the time. So everyone, as far as we know, has been served properly with the complaint.

JUDGE SWAIN: And there was an appearance on behalf of Amerindo, Mr. Licker was turning up for a while then ultimately withdrew.

MR. JACOBSON: We know we have several defaults. I don't know if we have an official default through the clerk's office, have a certificate and moved for default, we have not

done that. But there have been a number of defaults with respect to answering the complaint. So certainly one thing we could do is just start the procedure whereby we would make a move for default judgment or summary judgment, if necessary. But that could take some time. Get judgments, which we would contemplate doing in any event at some point in the case. And once a judgment is entered, and money judgments are entered, there would have to be some type of accommodation or agreement with the government, because all the assets are still subject.

JUDGE SWAIN: Assets would need to be released into something. I am trying to figure out whether there is a structure that assets could be released into that would permit the most expeditious approach that is consistent with Article III powers to getting money to investors.

MR. JACOBSON: Subject to what the criminal authority is going to -- what the government will do, I believe it is possible, if the defendants consented, or as part of a final judgment in our case, there were some other issues with respect to a final judgment --

MS. SHEVITZ: I can't hear you, I'm sorry.

MR. JACOBSON: -- such as injunctions that we typically seek --

If the defendants would consent as part of a final judgment in our case to relinquish any of their objections of the distribution of the money, and to allow the money to be

subject to the district court to the civil action jurisdiction, and appoint a receiver, that is something that could happen.

That is possible. That could be done in the case without us litigating, if we could reach some type of civil order with the defendants, and subject to the government's ability to relinquish the restraints on the assets.

JUDGE SWAIN: Again, I think that it would be expedient to think about and structure this mechanism in terms of \$17 million or some sum south of that so that we don't have to deal with the implications of the, right away with the implications of the forfeiture proceedings and contentions as to the whole universe of moneys. And if we can come up with a mechanism that people are comfortable with for the 17 million, maybe that ultimately turns into a mechanism for everything, but it seems to me a much larger, more complicated, and time-consuming job to say what can we do to take everything that is in the substitute assets order out into some other mechanism.

Let's see, so Ms. Shevitz was standing, and then Mr. Friedman stood, and then perhaps Mr. Jacobson can respond again once we have heard from them.

Ms. Shevitz.

MS. SHEVITZ: I would like to -- I'm reading from Mr. Tanas personal letter sent to your Honor. He says that he thinks Ross, David Ross, could bring the expert asset analysis

up to date for a cost of \$25,000. And probably could do it quickly. That's what we have suggested. And it seemed to be agreeable to the investors, as well, because then we'll know what is in the pot.

I also suggest -- Mr. Tanaka said that he has not received month-end statements of the principal Amerindo accounts for over three years from the custodian broker, ever since the changeover to JP Morgan Chase and it would be prudent to request back missing copies, and for him to be able to get copies, and everybody could help move this forward. The problem is that we have been excluded from the helping-moving-this-forward task, and we do want to move this forward. All of this litigate here, and litigate here, we don't want to do that either. We want to resolve this, but we're not going to resolve it on the back of a forfeiture we think is illegal.

JUDGE SWAIN: And that's why --

DEFENDANT TANAKA: May I be heard?

JUDGE SWAIN: Mr. Tanaka?

DEFENDANT TANAKA: First of all, can I have a copy of the transcript again?

JUDGE SWAIN: Yes, we'll arrange that.

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Yes, thank you.

And then to what Ms. Shevitz said, if David Ross has done additional work and given it to Mr. Friedman, can Mr.

Friedman submit that to court to see if we have up to date numbers, what have you?

MR. FRIEDMAN: I can, but I should say that all Mr. Ross did was confirm to me the valuations as of September 30, 2009, which were in the letters he sent to Judge Sullivan. The comment that the assets are now worth 50 million is a comment Mr. Ross has made, but I don't have any supporting documentation, because I have not talked to him in detail about it.

So my narrow answer to Mr. Tanaka's question is I don't know the basis on which Mr. Ross made that statement and whether there are any supporting work papers.

DEFENDANT TANAKA: So they're going to have to be used as a basis for further work for him, then, as long as he is half way there anyway.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I think that's correct.

MS. SHEVITZ: And, further, my suggestion would be then to ask these people who have been working on the case for 6 years to get the final list together of people who they think are the investors, and let's do that process while we're doing all of the rest.

In the appeal, the brief is due in two months, in March. Theoretically, the case could be on the calendar for argument 6 to 12 weeks after, that's the current schedule.

This is not going to be forever. In the interim, we are still

willing to do hardship things, if there is hardships. But why can't we just move this forward without all of these vehicles getting in the way of turf wars and CFR provisions and things like that.

JUDGE SWAIN: What is the "this" that you are proposing to move forward.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Yes.

MS. SHEVITZ: We can agree to a lot of things if we know the pot, and the investors, and the claimants. We don't know them. We don't know them. The government says they know now, 20 or 30 people, or what the claims are. Why can't we just — why can't — with all due respect, your Honor, order those to be produced now so we can see who it is and we can see what we're talking about. Then we could agree to more. If we know that we're not going to be liable at the end for claims, then we can agree to a lot of different things. But we just don't know what the facts are now.

JUDGE SWAIN: Well, at least an hour and a half ago,
Ms. Levin agreed that you would be given the government's and
SEC's list of known investors claims.

MS. SHEVITZ: Okay.

JUDGE SWAIN: That's been taken care of for a while.

MS. SHEVITZ: Okay, we have not gotten that yet,

though.

JUDGE SWAIN: Because she is still in the courtroom.

And so are all of us, and it's almost 7:00.

MS. SHEVITZ: I know, I know, I -- I know. But that's my suggestion of moving it forward with Mr. Ross.

JUDGE SWAIN: Are you saying that evaluation by Mr. Ross of the illiquid assets is a condition to Mr. Vilar's willingness to consent not to make a claim back against the government as to an interim distribution.

MS. SHEVITZ: It depends how much the interim distribution is.

JUDGE SWAIN: We have been talking about \$17 million as an interim distribution, covering all investors and something around \$2 million at this point as a hardship distribution, which would be a subset of the 17 million.

MS. SHEVITZ: Subset of it. Again, I have to talk to Mr. Vilar about this. A couple of issues come up. Will we need to reduce the forfeiture amount by whatever we agreed to distribute now, for one.

JUDGE SWAIN: I think that would -- well, the forfeiture amount or the substitute assets order?

MS. SHEVITZ: Well, the substitute assets go to the forfeiture amount. So that would be one of our conditions, that any payments that are made now reduce the forfeiture amount.

JUDGE SWAIN: Ms. Levin.

MS. LEVIN: The forfeiture amount -- the substitute

assets, the value of the substitute assets is applied against the money judgment that has been entered against the defendant, so that would reduce it. If it's not going to be a forfeiture, if we're doing this outside of the forfeiture process, that it doesn't necessarily reduce the forfeiture amount. It would —

JUDGE SWAIN: Would you agree to credit this against the forfeiture amount, let me put it that way. Obviously, it wouldn't happen --

MS. LEVIN: I would agree to credit this against the forfeiture amount.

But the other caveat, with respect to retaining an expert to value the private placements and private stock. We do not have authority to pay for that. The question is who is going to pay for it. If the assets are not being forfeited, then the marshal service who typically pays for those things out of the forfeited funds, they don't have authority to do so. So it's being done through a special masters process. I don't want to belabor the mechanics of it, but I want to make clear the government can't fund these expenses, so that would have to be through a special master or a receiver.

MR. NAFTALIS: The only thing I would add to that, your Honor, it may be premature to value the assets, because what we are talking about here is an interim distribution less than the amount of cash in the accounts, so we could value the assets now, but we're going to have to do it again later when

they are liquidated. And the accounts, right now, it's 20 plus million. And we are talking about 17 million. So we could fund this distribution with just cash, the privates will always be there and they can be valued when they are actually liquidated. So we can do it much more easily than involves lots and lots of --

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Judge Swain --

JUDGE SWAIN: I need you to go back about 50 words, slow it down, and be as clear as you can, because we're not hearing you.

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Thank you.

I find that there are a lot of e-mails and documents, judging by the government e-mail, its letter recently, suggesting more of the process of all of these e-mails, and bits, and memos that are going back and forth.

JUDGE SWAIN: So you're saying that in connection with this proceeding, you have seen that there have been a lot of e-mails and other --

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Yes, and --

JUDGE SWAIN: Mr. Tanaka -- Mr. Tanaka, hold on. Only one of us can speak at a time. I'm trying to restate my understanding of what you said, so that we can have an accurate record, so listen to me for just one second and we'll go stage by stage.

I believe I heard you saying, because the court

reporter didn't get this down exactly, that you have seen that there are a lot of communications by e-mail and otherwise that have not been copied to you, so that you have not fully been in the loop. Would that be fair?

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Judging by the letter, I have seen today from the government --

JUDGE SWAIN: And you're asking, then, that you be copied on the communications between the government and Mr. Vilar's counsel, and counsel for the claimant?

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Here's the question. If I'm representing myself, pro se, Judge Swain, should I be a direct recipient of these communications?

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Well, I think what happened last night is the government submitted, electronically, a letter with attachments that includes some of the things we talked about today. It was clear that you were not gonna see those in time, so I don't think you saw that letter, right?

DEFENDANT TANAKA: No, I didn't see that. But they referred to plenty of memos and communications during the summertime.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Well, I think --

DEFENDANT TANAKA: That I was not privy to that, that I'm completely in the dark about.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: The e-mails that were referenced were attachments to a letter from yesterday. And you'll get that

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letter by hard copy. It was unfortunate you couldn't get it before today, but we'll send that to you. It's probably been mailed to you already.

I'm not sure, if there are other things that -- that you think everyone referenced that you have not received, I think maybe once you look at the transcript, it might be more apparent as to what was being referred to.

JUDGE SWAIN: Well, let me say, things that are filed with the Court in the SEC action in which Mr. Tanaka is officially appearing pro se, absolutely have to be served on Mr. Tanaka, and served in the most rapid fashion. Given the questions that are in the air about proposals for more, you know, informal consensual arrangements and questions about verification of the universe of investors, and questions about how one goes about getting a handle on the universe of assets, it seems to me expedient that the assumption be that Mr. Tanaka be copied on correspondence among the parents in interest here so that we can move things along in the most efficient way. And I see nods from both the front and the back tables of lawyers here in the courtroom so, Mr. Tanaka, I think you'll probably be getting a little bit more mail. And Miss Eiger is here, as well, and she obviously has some things she needs to talk to you about, directly.

DEFENDANT TANAKA: Thank you. I'm going to buzz off now, if that's okay with you.

1 JUDGE SWAIN: All right. Thank you, Mr. Tanaka. 2 Thank you very much. DEFENDANT TANAKA: 3 (Mr. Tanaka no longer present) JUDGE SWAIN: Mr. Friedman. 4 MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, I will be very brief. 5 6 My only concern is I took it from the colloquy between 7 Mr. Jacobson and your Honor, and then between Ms. Shevitz and your Honor, that we are still dealing with the issue of do the 8 9 defendants, or will the defendants consent to some 10 distributions. And I just want to reiterate as clearly as I 11 can, they have admitted -- it is not me talking, it is the 12 defendants' admission that these were custodial funds. 13 don't have any right to consent, or withdraw, or withhold 14 consent and, therefore, I think that to let them withhold that 15 consent or condition that consent and stop the distribution process is giving them a veto power over something over which 16 17 they should not have a veto power. 18 JUDGE SULLIVAN: Ms. Levin is not cutting any checks until she has got an appellate judgment in her favor. 19 20 MR. FRIEDMAN: True, Judge, but I suggest that if your 21 Honors decide to go the receiver, or what I would argue 22 magistrate judge, but clearly that is not gonna fly. If you 23 would go the receiver route, it may be that checks will be cut

JUDGE SWAIN: Let me say this before Mr. Jacobson

prior to the decision on the appeal.

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speaks.

I think the issue here, and it is both a procedural issue and a substantive issue, is jurisdiction to deal with these assets. Right now, there is jurisdiction by virtue of the substitute assets order in the criminal case, that I know people have issues with, but it's there, it's entered, those have been declared substitute assets that are potentially subject to forfeiture in the criminal case.

Mr. Jacobson's point is that in the civil case which is an in personam, not an in rem proceeding, at least at this stage, the Court has to have some authority for dealing with assets and distributing assets that's procedurally consistent with the type of case. And short of going through a determination that results in a judgment that provides that, for legal reasons that are good and sufficient and consistent with due process, the Court can force a particular mode of distribution of a particular pool of assets as a practical matter and to get this done quickly, there needs to be something that the appropriate interested parties can agree to and sign off on as an expedient measure. And that's where we are. Because I can't give advisory opinions, I don't you know get to grab assets out of the air.

So what I would like to propose is this, that we talked about and set January 18th as the deadline for Messrs. Vilar and Tanaka to respond specifically to the

carveout for hardship request that, at this point, is the request on behalf of the Mayers for 1.8, and Mr. Heitkoenig's cousin for 50,000. And the counsel for Ms. Sayko wanted an opportunity to identify a short-term hardship request on her behalf. Mr. Hall, you can submit and copy a letter that really has to be a letter that, in your capacity as an officer of the court, represents what Ms. Sayko would say would be necessary to keep her from being, you know, put out of her apartment and reduced to eating things that people shouldn't have to eat.

MR. HALL: I understand.

JUDGE SWAIN: Over the next 6 months. Whatever that number is. Communicate that by letter by, today's Tuesday, end of business Thursday of this week?

JUDGE SULLIVAN: Yes.

JUDGE SWAIN: And defense counsel to respond to the Court and counsel by next Wednesday as to the individual defendants' position on allowing that amount of funding, or some subset thereof, to be distributed very quickly to the hardship cases.

And it seems to me that the mechanism for distributing that would need to be the government agreeing to release that carveout. It would have to be a stipulation that has the government releasing that carveout from the substitute assets order, and the defendant's agreeing that they will not make a claim at the end of the day against the government for that

amount as improperly distributed, period.

And, then, as to the structure for an approach to the remainder of the 17 million, what I propose is that Judge Sullivan and I consider everything that has been said today and within the next, you know, 24 to 72 hours, we'd aim by the end of the week to issue an order that would outline a structure and provide an opportunity for parties in interest to respond to, or object to, that structure and try to move on from there. Because I think there have been enough different concepts floating around this room that asking you all to talk and propose something to the Court would not really be productive.

Judge Sullivan, would you be willing to -
JUDGE SULLIVAN: Yeah, I think that makes the most
sense.

MR. FRIEDMAN: How if at all would the order that you contemplate issuing deal with amounts above 17 million; in other words, the remainder of the liquid assets and the public securities.

JUDGE SWAIN: Frankly, my conception is not to deal directly with that, if at all, in this order. It is possible that we may think that some approach to valuation or putting out the concept of the feasibility of an in-kind distribution of the private securities, you know, interests in the private securities. Maybe want to ask you that question in connection with this order. But I think what we would want to work on

would be a mechanism for distribution of liquid assets in a claim process that would be appropriate to those liquid assets.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Quickly, I would suggest to your Honor that the liquid assets are not limited to 17 million.

Remember, the 17 million, it was a compromise proposal.

JUDGE SWAIN: Yes.

MR. FRIEDMAN: The liquid asset number, I think, is significantly higher than the 17 million.

JUDGE SWAIN: I understand that. And that's one reason I'm trying to focus on the most significant, least controversial amount of money.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I will be quiet.

JUDGE SWAIN: Mr. Begos has been standing for a while.

MR. BEGOS: Two quick points. Could I ask that the responses by defense counsel be also served on all of the nonparties like the prior letters have in the last couple of weeks.

JUDGE SWAIN: That's why I said copy to the court, counsel, and all parties in interest.

MR. BEGOS: Okay, very well.

And the other point I just wanted to make, I did mention before I started talking about the mayor's needs when the discussion was as to the Court's authority to enter some sort of order, this is sort of a counter point to Mr.

Friedman's position that the defendants don't have an interest

in the money that is in the accounts.

To the extent that the defendants do claim some interest and do claim that they need to be consulted or approve distributions, 18 U.S.C. 36130 A(a)(1) gives Judge Sullivan the authority upon a finding that the defendant is in default on a payment of a fine or restitution, the Court may take any action necessary to obtain compliance with the order or fine or restitution.

Obviously, Judge Sullivan, you are the only one who can determine whether there is a default in the order of restitution. It was not a payment over time, it was a payment immediately. And to the extent your Honor is convinced that there is a default, then my reading of this section is that your Honor has fairly broad discretion to fashion any kind of relief that would be appropriate to have the restitution paid. And that deals with the five criminal victims and not everybody else. But I do believe that is one other piece of ammunition that — or power that the Court has here that may prove relevant.

JUDGE SWAIN: We'll take that under advisement.

MR. BEGOS: Thank you.

JUDGE SWAIN: Ms. Shevitz.

MS. SHEVITZ: Two things.

Mr. Lusk has said this, and I think I need to say, that the private securities must be managed. It is criminal to

not manage them now. I don't understand all of it, what goes on. But, apparently, there could be Facebook stock that needs to be claimed, or should have been claimed in some of these private securities that are sitting in a drawer that nobody has looked at and nobody has managed. And if nobody starts managing them now, it's going to be worse. It's going to — perhaps he could say something.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I think the point's been made. I think that's understood.

MR. LUSK: I'll be happy to write the Court.

MS. SHEVITZ: Because I don't totally understand how this works.

JUDGE SWAIN: We understand it conceptually, if not --

MS. SHEVITZ: The last thing I want to say is I did move for stay of forfeiture. And to the extent that the Court is considering moving forward with that, I need an order so that I can exercise my appellate right, because that is immediately appealable.

JUDGE SULLIVAN: I'm not sure I --

JUDGE SWAIN: We are talking about a structure for carving money out of the forfeiture process.

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes.

And to that extent, if this forfeiture just sits there, I'll be glad to wait, too, but to the extent anybody enters an order of forfeiture or does anything else under a

forfeiture mantel, I need to have my appellate rights, by having your Honor --

JUDGE SULLIVAN: No, obviously, we're not there yet. The request is to hear from your client with respect to the hardship money which would be on consent, and then we'll issue an order later this week that directs the parties to do some follow up with respect to interim distributions that will be faster than waiting for the appeals process to exhaust itself.

MS. SHEVITZ: Okay. And my point is that, as long as it is not within the forfeiture, I don't have a problem. If it is — or if we don't get a credit to the forfeiture. We need the credit to the forfeiture. But if there is any ordered concerning the forfeiture aspect of this, within forfeiture, I have moved for a stay, and that motion is pending.

JUDGE SWAIN: We hear you.

MS. SHEVITZ: Thank you.

JUDGE SWAIN: And Judge Sullivan hears you.

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes.

JUDGE SWAIN: Which is the important thing.

MS. EIGER: I have a single brief point, just because that \$17 million has come up again and I don't want that single point I have made today to be lost, that a fair distribution of anything depends upon ascertaining what the total pot is and what the total claims are. Because you cannot — because fairness requires that and, otherwise, we may be favoring some

of the claimants over others.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I said I would shut up, but Mr. Marcus just handed me a note back on the hardship issue.

Mr. Marcus informs me that there are two members of his family, both of whom are ATGF investors, that do have family financial needs. And I would ask for the same opportunity -- I'm not in a position now to articulate the reasons with any detail, because I have just gotten this note -- but I ask for the same deadline that you gave Mr. Hall, just to put in a letter that describes what is in the note that Mr. Marcus just gave me.

JUDGE SWAIN: Close of business Thursday?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you.

JUDGE SWAIN: All right. Did the government or the SEC just send Mr. Tanaka a copy of the transcript last time? I'm hoping the answer to that will be yes.

MR. SALZBERG: Yes.

MS. SHEVITZ: We are CJA, I would like a copy.

JUDGE SWAIN: Do the form and Judge Sullivan will sign off on that.

All right, thank you all very much. I think we have made a great deal of progress at least in communicating with each other today. And Judge Sullivan and I will come out with this order, and I hope that we will make progress on the distributions quickly, as well. Good evening. Keep well,

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